Cyber Resilience Act Gap FinderProduct list reading ยท Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, UK PSTI, Cal. Civ. Code 1798.91.04

ETSI EN 303 645: what it asks of a product list

The consumer IoT baseline standard behind the PSTI regime's deemed-compliance route, held here at provision level (V3.1.3). Each provision is cited with its status in Table B.1: mandatory (a shall provision) or recommended (a should provision), and where the table makes it conditional or tied to a feature, the condition is stated with it.

Each provision is cited at provision level, V3.1.3, with its status in Table B.1 (mandatory or recommended, and any condition or feature it depends on).

Duties by role

RoleClauses
manufacturerETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.1-1 (mandatory) Passwords unique per device or set by the user
ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.2-1 (mandatory) Public vulnerability disclosure policy
ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.3-2 (mandatory) Secure update mechanism present
ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.3-13 (mandatory) Defined support period published
importernone here
distributornone here
own brand (becomes the manufacturer)ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.1-1 (mandatory) Passwords unique per device or set by the user
ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.2-1 (mandatory) Public vulnerability disclosure policy
ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.3-2 (mandatory) Secure update mechanism present
ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.3-13 (mandatory) Defined support period published

Notes that cite it

NoteClause
5. No support period stated, or under five years with no reason recordedETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.3-13 (mandatory)
6. A universal default passwordETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.1-1 (mandatory)
ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.1-2 (mandatory)
7. No published vulnerability contactETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.2-1 (mandatory)
8. No security update mechanism, or unsigned updatesETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.3-2 (mandatory)
ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.3-7 (mandatory)
ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.3-10 (mandatory)

ETSI EN 303 645: every clause cited

7 of the 78 held

The requirement text is our statement of each clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text; it is not the instrument verbatim.

ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.1-1 (mandatory)Passwords unique per device or set by the user Table B.1: mandatory; applies only where passwords can authenticate users to the device or machines to each other

Where the device uses passwords to authenticate users or for machine-to-machine authentication, every password in any state other than factory default is either unique to that individual device or chosen by the user. Universal defaults such as the same admin credentials across a product line are prohibited; unique pre-installed passwords, a user-chosen password at initialization, or a non-password method all satisfy it. Standard pairing codes are not treated as machine-to-machine passwords. Status in Table B.1: M F (a) (mandatory, a shall provision; applies only where passwords can authenticate users to the device or machines to each other).

What a notified body or authority asks to see: Inventory of every password-protected interface (UI, web, API, network protocol, service accounts); Production-line or provisioning record showing per-device password generation or forced user setup at initialization; Test evidence from two units showing different credentials and no shared account
Where lists usually fall short: A hidden service or maintenance account with a fleet-wide password left in firmware; Telnet, SSH or RTSP interfaces overlooked when the web UI was fixed
Source: ETSI EN 303 645 (consumer IoT baseline)
ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.1-2 (mandatory)Pre-installed unique passwords generated to resist automated attack Table B.1: mandatory; applies only where pre-installed unique per-device passwords are used for authentication

Where unique pre-installed passwords are used, they are generated by a mechanism that lowers the risk of automated attacks against a whole class or type of device, for example by sufficient randomisation. Incrementing counters or passwords derived from public values such as the MAC address or the Wi-Fi SSID do not meet it. Status in Table B.1: M F (b) (mandatory, a shall provision; applies only where pre-installed unique per-device passwords are used for authentication).

What a notified body or authority asks to see: Description of the password generation algorithm and its entropy source; Evidence the generator input does not include serial number, MAC, SSID or other broadcast values; Sample of generated passwords reviewed for predictable patterns
Where lists usually fall short: Password printed on the label derived from the MAC address by a reversible function; Random source seeded identically on the production line
Source: ETSI EN 303 645 (consumer IoT baseline)
ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.2-1 (mandatory)Public vulnerability disclosure policy Table B.1: mandatory

The manufacturer publishes a vulnerability disclosure policy that at least gives contact information for reporting issues, timelines for acknowledging receipt of a report, and timelines for status updates to the reporter until the issue is resolved. ETSI TR 103 838 and ISO/IEC 29147 give guidance on coordinated vulnerability disclosure. Status in Table B.1: M (mandatory, a shall provision).

What a notified body or authority asks to see: Published disclosure policy URL with contact route (security.txt, web form or mailbox); Stated acknowledgement and status-update timelines in the policy; Log of recent reports showing acknowledgements sent within the stated time
Where lists usually fall short: Policy exists but the contact mailbox is unmonitored; No commitment to keep the reporter informed after first acknowledgement
Source: ETSI EN 303 645 (consumer IoT baseline)
ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.3-2 (mandatory)Secure update mechanism present Table B.1: mandatory; conditional on no use-case resource constraint prevents an update mechanism

The device has a secure update mechanism, meaning adequate measures stop an attacker misusing it (for example authentic update servers, integrity-protected channels, verification of update authenticity and integrity, anti-rollback). The only exception is a resource constraint determined by the use case, such as minimal bandwidth or energy; cost alone is not a valid constraint. Status in Table B.1: M C (15) (mandatory, a shall provision; conditional on no use-case resource constraint prevents an update mechanism).

What a notified body or authority asks to see: Update architecture document covering server authentication, channel protection, package signing and rollback protection; Penetration test or review of the update path; Where claimed, engineering justification of the use-case resource constraint
Where lists usually fall short: Downgrade to an older vulnerable image accepted; Constraint claimed on grounds of cost rather than a genuine design limit
Source: ETSI EN 303 645 (consumer IoT baseline)
ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.3-7 (mandatory)Best practice cryptography for secure updates Table B.1: mandatory; applies only where the device's software can be updated

Signing, verification and transport of updates rely on best practice cryptography: the device uses it to support its secure update mechanism, for example in signing, verification and transport of update packages. Status in Table B.1: M F (g) (mandatory, a shall provision; applies only where the device's software can be updated).

What a notified body or authority asks to see: Signing algorithm, key sizes and verification library for update packages; Key custody arrangements for the update signing key; Evidence the choices are checked against current cryptographic guidance
Where lists usually fall short: Update integrity protected by CRC or an unkeyed hash only
Source: ETSI EN 303 645 (consumer IoT baseline)
ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.3-10 (mandatory)Network-delivered updates verified through a trust relationship Table B.1: mandatory; applies only where updates can be delivered over a network interface

Where updates arrive over a network interface, the device verifies the authenticity and integrity of each one through a trust relationship, such as an authenticated channel, a network requiring a secret to join, a digital signature or user confirmation, so that no unauthorised management platform or device can install malicious code. A trusted hub may verify on behalf of a constrained device and pass the update over a secure channel. Status in Table B.1: M F (j) (mandatory, a shall provision; applies only where updates can be delivered over a network interface).

What a notified body or authority asks to see: Description of the trust relationship used for over-the-air updates; Test attempting an update from an unauthorised server or peer; Where a hub verifies, evidence of the secure channel from hub to device
Where lists usually fall short: Any host on the local network can push firmware to an open update port
Source: ETSI EN 303 645 (consumer IoT baseline)
ETSI EN 303 645 Provision 5.3-13 (mandatory)Defined support period published Table B.1: mandatory

The manufacturer publishes the defined support period, the minimum time for which security updates will be provided, in a way that is accessible, clear and transparent to the user, such as on the official website at purchase and through the product's life. Status in Table B.1: M (mandatory, a shall provision).

What a notified body or authority asks to see: Published support period for each model (page URL, packaging or listing text); Evidence the period is expressed as a duration or end date; Internal record tying the published period to engineering commitment
Where lists usually fall short: Support period stated only in terms and conditions few buyers read; Period tied vaguely to 'product lifetime' with no date
Source: ETSI EN 303 645 (consumer IoT baseline)